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A Theory of Hypothetical Contract
Legal theorists have struggled to find general principles to explain the
common law of restitution for unsolicited benefits.' This Note proposes a
theory of hypothetical contract to govern such cases. A hypothetical con-
tract is one that a court writes for the parties because it is convinced that
both parties would have agreed to its terms at the time the unsolicited
benefit was conferred.2 The Note argues that a court should impose a
hypothetical contract if two conditions are met: 1) high transaction costs
precluded an express contract;' and 2) imposing a hypothetical contract
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, QUASI-CoNTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
§ 1 (1937) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION] (beneficiary is liable if unjustly
enriched); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (same); Landes
& Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (efficiency considerations may explain common law rules
denying recovery for most "rescues" of life or property); Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred
Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 (1966) ("One who, without intent to act gratuitously,
confers a measurable benefit upon another, is entitled to restitution, if he affords the other an oppor-
tunity to decline the benefit or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so."); see also R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97-98, 131-34, 188-89 (2d ed. 1977) (summarizing Landes & Posner,
supra). But cf. I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 49 (1963) (Quasi-contract includes
"numerous odds and ends of obligation . . . even though they have little in common with consensual
agreement and . . . great differences among themselves.").
2. This Note does not consider cases in which the beneficiary subsequently promises to pay for the
benefit. Courts have enforced such promises under the doctrine of moral consideration. See Webb v.
McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935) (subsequent promise to pay for life rescue enforce-
able against decedent's estate). But see Harrington v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E.2d 227 (1945)
(subsequent promise to pay plaintiff for preventing defendant's wife from killing defendant unenforce-
able). See generally Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and
the Law of Contract, 57 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1971) (favoring liability based on subsequent promises).
Since the subsequent promise is persuasive evidence that the defendant was willing to pay for the
benefit, no theory of hypothetical consent is required to impose liability.
3. Contracts are traditionally classified as express, implied-in-fact, or implied-in-law. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-12, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1977). The contract is
express if the agreement is manifested by written or spoken words, and implied-in-fact if the agree-
ment is manifested by other conduct. See Erickson v. Goodell Oil Co., 384 Mich. 207, 212, 180
N.W.2d 798, 800 (1970). "Contract implied in law" is a somewhat disfavored synonym for "quasi-
contract." See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 19, at 44. The authorities agree that a quasi-contract is
not a contract at all, since there is no actual manifestation of assent. See, e.g., Bradkin v. Leverton, 26
N.Y.2d 192, 196-97, 257 N.E.2d 643, 645, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195-96 (1970) (quasi-contracts not
contracts at all); I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3A, at 13 (3d ed.
1957) (only requirement is that quasi-contract more nearly resemble contract than tort). The common
law of quasi-contract is supposed to have developed for procedural reasons. After Slade's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602) (no subsequent promise necessary for action of assumpsit to lie), it was con-
venient to allow plaintiffs to use a writ of assumpsit and plead a fictitious promise in some cases in
which no promise at all had been given. See Ames, The History ofAssumpsit (pt. 2), 2 HARV. L. REV.
53, 63-69 (1888).
Hypothetical contract is not synonymous with quasi-contract, since courts frequently impose quasi-
contractual liability without considering the actual or hypothetical intentions of the parties. See Schott
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 290-91, 259 A.2d 443, 449 (1969) (quasi-contractual
liability not based on apparent intentions of the parties); 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 19, at 46
(quasi-contractual liability imposed in spite of strong disagreement of the parties); Wade, supra note
1, at 1185 (unjust enrichment principle non-consensual).
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results in a Pareto-superior transaction.
This hypothetical contract theory explains some patterns of common
law rules better than three competing analyses: the restitutive 5 principle of
unjust enrichment,6 Richard Posner's wealth-maximization principle,,
and Richard Epstein's theory of strict liability in tort." A contract-based
approach, moreover, protects autonomy values9 better than any of the al-
ternative approaches.
Part I argues that the unjust enrichment principle judges invoke in un-
solicited benefit cases requires supplementation. Part II proposes and de-
fends a theory of hypothetical contract. Part III applies the hypothetical
contract theory to the common law of restitution for unsolicited benefits.10
I. THE NEED FOR A HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACT THEORY
Common law courts have decided a wide variety of unsolicited benefit
cases. The results of these cases cannot be explained by the unjust enrich-
ment principle alone, since that principle is too general to provide guid-
ance in specific cases. Supplementing the unjust enrichment principle with
a hypothetical contract theory explains many prior decisions and provides
guidance for future cases.
4. State A is Pareto-superior to State B if some individuals are better off in State A than in State
B, and no individuals are worse off. For a general discussion of the concept of Pareto superiority, see
A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21-27 (1970); see also Coleman, Efficiency,
Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspect of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAuF. L. REv.
221, 226-31 (1980) (non-technical discussion of Paretian concepts). See infra p. 422 (discussing ap-
plication of Pareto-superiority concept to hypothetical contracts).
5. "Restitution" is a broader term than "quasi-contract." Quasi-contract properly refers only to
actions at law for damages. Restitution also includes equitable remedies such as subrogation, construc-
tive trusts, and equitable liens. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 2.20, at 99 (1982).
6. The unjust enrichment principle states that "A person who receives a benefit by reason of an
infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in
the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RES-
TrrTION, supra note 1, § 1. See generally J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951) (discussion,
based on civil law cases, of principle that no one should be made richer through another's loss).
7. See infra p. 423.
8. See infra p. 433.
9. Roughly, an individual's autonomy is violated when she is treated as the involuntary instru-
ment of another's happiness. Rights may be viewed as individual boundaries which limit such viola-
tions. See R. NoziCg, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57-87 (1974); Kronman, Wealth Maximiza-
tion as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 233 (1980).
10. The hypothetical contract idea does not apply only to the law of restitution. The notion has
been used to explain aspects of bankruptcy law. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitle-
ments, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (hypothetical "creditors' bargain").
Hypothetical contract has also been applied to the attorney-client relationship in some class action
suits. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1597 (1974) (hypothetical contracts to vindicate the public interest); Dawson, Lawyers and Involun-
tary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975) (hypothetical contracts to
prosecute class actions).
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Hypothetical Contract
A. Inadequacy of the Unjust Enrichment Principle
The common law has been hostile to claims based on unsolicited bene-
fits."1 Courts have allowed recovery to unsolicited intervenors in relatively
few situations: providing necessities to children;1" burying the dead; 3 pay-
ing another's debts in certain circumstances;1 4 attempts by physicians to
save lives;" saving property, in some cases; 6 and conferring a benefit by
mistake.1 7 Those who intervene in the affairs of others are often branded
as "officious intermeddlers" and denied any recovery.1" Intermeddlers
11. "No person may be made a debtor against his will" is a common law slogan. See Boston Ice
Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 30 (1877); Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co. [18861 34 Ch. D. 234,
248 (Bowen, L.J.) ("Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than
you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will.").
12. See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 159, 44 N.W. 295, 298 (1890) (inferring from legal duty
to support children a promise by parent to pay for necessities furnished to child); Van Valkinburgh v.
Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (third party supplying necessities to child when parent
neglected to do so entitled to charge parent). See also McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md.
573, 113 A. 107 (1921) (wife is authorized to pledge husband's credit to obtain necessities where
husband fails to fulfill legal obligation to support wife); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note
1, § 113 (One who performs another's non-contractual duty to supply necessities to third person is
entitled to restitution.).
13. See Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co. v. Hamil, 160 Mo. App. 521, 140 S.W. 951 (1911) (em-
ployer may recover funeral expenses of employee who died at work when arrangements were made
with knowledge of relatives); Rogers v. Price, 148 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1829) (legal duty of executor to
bury deceased gives rise to an implied promise by executor to pay for funeral furnished by third
person).
14. See Allyn v. Dreher, 124 Neb. 342, 246 N.W. 731 (1933) (holder of a subordinate mortgage
who pays interest payments on superior mortgage to protect his own subordinate lien may be equita-
bly entitled to subrogation). The cases are discussed in Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437-43 (1974). The general rule, however, is that there is no recovery for
unsolicited payment of the debt of another. See Kelley v. Lindsey, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 287, 290 (1856).
Commentators have criticized this general rule, arguing that, since debts are usually freely assignable,
courts should grant recovery. See Wade, supra note 1, at 1206-08. This argument ignores the pos-
sibilities that the original creditor may be more likely than his successor to forgive the debt, or that the
original creditor may herself owe the debtor money.
15. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907) (surgeon operating on unconscious
accident victim allowed compensation); Matheson v. Smiley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. Ct. App.)
(surgeon entitled to payment even though defendant was unable to give consent). Recovery is permit-
ted only where the service was rendered with intent to charge under circumstances which prevented
the plaintiff from obtaining the defendant's consent. Cf. Soldiers Memorial Hospital v. Sanford,
[1934] 2 D.L.R. 334 (N.S.S.C.) (recovery denied where plaintiff taken to hospital against his will).
16. E.g., Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871) (owner liable to one who saves and repairs
lost boat); Berry v. Barbour, 279 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954) (plaintiff, already under contract to repair
defendant's building, who repairs roof damage after fire, entitled to reimbursement). Most cases, how-
ever, deny restitution. E.g., Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who saves defendant's wheat stack from fire); Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567,
577-78, 13 P. 442, 448 (1887) (denying recovery to plaintiff who saves lumber that falls into river).
17. See Sykes v. Sykes, 262 Ala. 277, 78 So. 2d 273 (1954) (plaintiff who has paid to improve real
property in erroneous belief that she was equitable owner is entitled to a lien on the property for the
amount expended). But see Federal Land Bank v. Dorman, 112 Ind. App. 111, 41 N.E.2d 661 (1942)
(denying recovery to one who mistakenly paid taxes due on real property).
18. See Hope, Officiousness (pts. 1 & 2), 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 205, 242 (1929, 1930) (courts
will grant restitution for intervention in another's affairs only when a special public interest is at stake
or the intervenor acts to protect himself).
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themselves may be held civilly 9 or even criminally20 liable. These anti-
interventionist rules differ markedly from those of the civil law, which
often permit recovery of expenses incurred in conferring unsolicited bene-
fits,2 ' and from the rules of admiralty, which allow salvors to recover part
of the value of salved property.22
Judges purport to decide unsolicited benefit cases by applying the resti-
tutionary principle of unjust enrichment.23 Merely invoking "unjust en-
richment," however, begs two crucial questions: 1) was there an enrich-
ment?; and 2) if so, was it unjust? Some intermediate principles are
required to give substance to the highly abstract concept of unjust enrich-
ment.24 The cases do not provide any such principles.23 Without supple-
mentation, "unjust enrichment" is a conclusory label that judges affix
when they have decided, for whatever reason, to allow the plaintiff to
recover.
B. Filling Contractual Gaps
Since the common law employs the concept of hypothetical contract in a
closely analogous situation, it is logical to turn to a hypothetical contract
theory as a source of intermediate principles. The hypothetical contract
19. E.g., Maxwell v. Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920) (one who has another arrested
for insanity bears burden of showing person arrested was both insane and dangerous in subsequent
civil suit); Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 390, 82 A.2d 458
(1951) (jury may find rink official liable for negligent attempt to set broken arm).
20. Criminal liability might arise if, for example, a would-be rescuer interferes with an under-
cover police officer making a lawful arrest. See People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (defendant properly convicted of assault for using non-deadly force against plain-
clothes policeman trying to make lawful arrest). But see State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174
A.2d 506 (1961) (defendant not guilty if he reasonably believed his actions necessary to protect third
party from unlawful attack).
21. Recovery has been allowed under the Roman law doctrine of negotiorum gestio ("management
of another's affair"). See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler (pts. 1 & 2), 74
HARV. L. REV. 817, 1073 (1961) (arguing that negotiorum gestio should not be transplanted into
common law).
22. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF AnMIRA.tTY 532-85 (2d ed. 1975). The rules of
admiralty permit no recovery for saving life, however, unless property is also saved. See generally
Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at Sea, 77 MIcH. L. REv. 1218, 1263-87 (1979)
(suggesting that courts should be allowed to make awards for pure life salvage).
23. See, e.g., Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147, 154, 650 P.2d 449, 456 (1982)
("well established that a person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required
to make restitution to the other"); Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Greenwich, 156 Conn. 561, 564-65, 244 A.2d
404, 405-06 (1968) (One who unjustly enriches himself at the expense of another should be required
to make restitution.).
24. See RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrITION ch. 1 note (unjust enrichment "too indefinite to be of
value in a specific case ... or not universally applied"); 3 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRAC s §
1503, at 2567 (2d ed. 1920) (unjust enrichment principle "so vague as to give no help in solving cases
as they arise").
25. The Restatement of Restitution allows restitution for unsolicited benefits if the benefit was
necessary to protect the interests of others or of third parties. RESTATEMENT OF RESTTTrrION, supra
note 1, § 112. As an intermediate principle, however, this is nearly as indeterminate as the unjust
enrichment principle itself.
Hypothetical Contract
idea is used to justify the routine and uncontroversial28 process of judi-
cially implying terms missing from express contracts.17 In a typical gap-
filling situation, the state of the world at the time of performance differs
greatly from what the parties had assumed it would be, and therefore the
court struggles to apply the contract to conditions that it was not designed
to cover.28 In many gap-filling situations, neither party foresaw the
changed conditions.29 In such cases the court often imposes a term it be-
lieves the parties would have agreed to, had they foreseen the contin-
gency 30 -that is, the court imposes a hypothetical agreement.
Gap-filling situations are closely analogous to the unsolicited benefit
cases, even though there is no pre-existing contractual relationship in the
latter cases. The mere fact that in a gap-filling situation the parties actu-
ally agreed to some contractual terms does not necessarily indicate that
they would have agreed to other terms imposed by a court.31 In fact, there
is no less basis for hypothetical agreement in unsolicited benefit cases, in
26. The practice has been endorsed even by commentators strongly committed to the protection of
individual autonomy. See C. FRIED, CoNTRAar AS PROMISE 69 (1981) ("irrational" not to fill gaps
in contracts); Epstein, Private-Law Models for Official Immunity, 42 LAW & CONTErMa. PROBS. 53,
55 (1978) (When a tort occurs in the course of a consensual relationship, the court must "approxi-
mate the risks which each of the parties would have assumed if they had reached an express agree-
ment allocating them.").
27. As the rule that "material" terms (specifying subject matter, price, payment terms, quality,
quantity, duration, and work to be done) must be definite has been undercut, gap-filling has been
employed in a widening variety of situations. See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978) ("Even though one or
more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended
to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."); I A.
CORBIN, supra note 1, §§ 95-100; 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, §§ 38-48.
28. Other gap-filling situations raise only evidentiary questions, because the parties had some
actual intention as to the contingency. They may have intended the court to imply a term, if the
contingency arose; they may have intended the court to imply a term to cover any unforeseen contin-
gency which arose. This "global" intention is common: The court will read into a contract the whole
body of contract law, including the doctrines of mistake, frustration, and impossibility, unless the
parties specifically provide otherwise. On the other hand, the parties may have intended the court not
to imply any terms. The court's task in these cases is to determine the parties' actual, rather than
hypothetical, intentions.
29. In deciding whether they are faced with a contractual gap, judges consider whether the contin-
gency was foreseeable. See Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944); E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 5, § 7.16, at 522.
30. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gray Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (concluding that, if a condition had been requested, it would have been assented to); J.
BENTHAM, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 191 (J.
Bowring ed. 1843) (Judges should remedy "the shortsightedness of individuals, by doing for them
what they would have done for themselves, if their imagination had anticipated the march of na-
ture."); Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 860, 860 (1968)
("Characteristically, common law courts have dealt with problems arising out of what the parties did
not say about a situation by purporting to determine what the parties would have said if they had said
something about it.").
31. A standard economic justification of gap-filling is that it saves the parties the expense of
negotiating an endless series of terms to cover remote contingencies. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at
69 (contract law reduces transaction costs by supplying a set of normal terms the parties need not
negotiate expressly). The fact that the contingency was remote will not support the conclusion that the
parties would have agreed to the term the court imposes.
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general, 2 than in gap-filling situations. In the latter cases, the parties
might have agreed to the term the court imposes, or they might have
agreed to some other term, or they might have agreed to no term at all,
thus allowing the loss to lie where it fell."3
II. A MODEL OF HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACT
A court is justified in imposing a hypothetical contract on the parties
only if there is evidence that the parties would have agreed, had they been
able, to the terms and conditions the court imposes.34 A court should not
impose liability unless it finds that: 1) high transaction costs precluded
negotiation of an express contract; and 2) the hypothetical contract is
Pareto-superior. Together, these two conditions supply content to the
principle of unjust enrichment and explain many of the unsolicited benefit
decisions.
A. Prohibitive Transaction Costs
A court should not impose a hypothetical contract if the parties could
have negotiated an express agreement, for two reasons. First, the fact that
the parties might have negotiated an express contract, but did not, sug-
gests that at least one of them did not wish to be contractually bound. 5
The second reason is more fundamental. At least one purpose of con-
32. Although the express agreement is an additional source of general information about the way
in which the parties tended to allocate risks, by hypothesis that information is not decisive.
33. Commentators have recognized this indeterminacy, and concluded that judges fill gaps with
"equitable" or "reasonable" terms. See, e.g., I A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 19, at 46-47; E. FARNS-
woRTH, supra note 5, § 7.16, at 524-25; Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J.
739, 743-44 (1919).
34. According to the theory set forth in this Note, a hypothetical contract may be imposed if, at
the moment the benefit was conferred, the beneficiary would have agreed to pay for the benefit. It is
also possible to imagine a hypothetical contract among all citizens to render mutual assistance, made
before any particular opportunity to confer benefits has arisen. This broader notion of hypothetical
cotract has been employed by a number of legal commentators, notably Richard Posner. See R. Pos-
NER, THE ECONOMICS OF JusTicE 88-115 (1981); see also Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation
Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407, 409-12 (1972) (possibility of applying Pareto test to several redistribu-
tions simultaneously). Posner uses the notion of ex ante compensation to justify many tort liability
rules. He analogizes a pedestrian who is hit by a non-negligent motorist to a losing ticketholder in a
fair lottery. R. POSNER, supra, at 98. This is a false analogy, however, because individuals can choose
to enter a lottery, but they generally cannot choose whether or not to be governed by legal rules.
The related notion of implicit in-kind compensation has appealed to many scholars, including some
who are strongly opposed to interference with individual liberty. See, e.g., C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY
OF VALUES 187-91 (1970) (each individual is exposed by others to a certain amount of risk, but in
turn exposes others to a roughly equivalent amount of risk); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective jus-
tice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 84-85 (1979) (some nuisances permissible
because each individual imposes equivalent inconvenience on others); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972) (arguing tort liability should be based on whether parties
to lawsuit impose reciprocal risks on each other).
35. Failure to contract is not conclusive, however, because the parties may have failed to contract
out of simple inadvertence.
Hypothetical Contract
tract-arguably the primary purpose-is to give legal effect to individuals'
orderings of their own affairs."6 This basic purpose is defeated if the im-
position of a hypothetical contract short-circuits a potential express
contract.3
7
Although the transaction costs requirement limits the scope of the hypo-
thetical contract theory, the theory is still useful. In practice, many ex-
press contracts are impossible because transaction costs are prohibitive.
There are so many potential "rescue" situations and "rescuers" that it
would be impossible ex ante to negotiate contracts covering all potential
rescues.38 Moreover, once a rescue situation arises, there may be no time
to bargain. 9 One of the parties may be unconscious, 0 incompetent,41 or
simply unavailable. 42 Thus the transaction costs standing in the way of
36. See C. FRIED, supra note 26, at 16 (obligation to keep promises grounded in individual auton-
omy rather than utility); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACrS 2-6 (2d ed. 1970) (contract
viewed as means to achieve freedom). If individuals were entitled to force others into transactions, they
would have, in essence, a private right of eminent domain. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1106-08
(1972) (discussing eminent domain as paradigm of liability rule).
Some scholars have argued that contract law should serve quite different ends. Some argue, for
example, that contract law should reflect society's distributional preferences. See, e.g., Kronman, Con-
tract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 472-73 (1980) (society's distributional prefer-
ences must be taken into account for contract law to have "minimal moral acceptability"); Michelman,
Norms and Normnativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1016-37 (1978)
(housing code regulation of rental contracts justifiable as a redistributive measure even if economically
inefficient). These commentators do not deny that enforcing private agreements is a core purpose of
contract law. They merely deny that it is the only purpose. See Kronman, supra at 472 ("nearly
universal agreement" among contract scholars that a legitimate purpose of contract law is to enforce
private agreements; redistribution a possible additional purpose).
Other scholars go further, and argue that freedom of contract is merely an endpoint on a spectrum
of state-imposed duties. E.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1778 (1976) (judges should create "altruistic order" in context of contract law); Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 639-48 (1983) (obligations arise pri-
marily from relationships of mutual dependence that have been only incompletely shaped by state-
imposed duties or explicit and perfected bargains). Hypothetical contract theory has little appeal if
this position is accepted. If express agreement is unimportant, so is hypothetical agreement.
37. Economists favor express contract for a third reason-allocative efficiency. Individuals are
assumed to be the best judges of their own preferences; hence any other method of allocating resources
will result in less total welfare. The preference is not absolute, however, because the efficient solution
may be non-contractual if transaction costs are very high. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29, 74-77 (1972).
38. It would be prohibitively expensive, for example, for a shipowner to contract with every ship
that might be able to effect a rescue if a hazardous situation develops during the voyage. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 1, at 90-91 n.18.
39. See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (wheat stack threatened
by fire); Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567, 13 P. 442 (1887) (lumber fallen in river).
40. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907) (doctor recovers for assisting
patient who dies without regaining consciousness); In re Crisan's Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 107 N.W.2d
907 (1961) (hospital recovers for same).
41. See Schaefer v. Schaefer, 255 Mass. 175, 151 N.E. 119 (1926) (allowing recovery for services
to insane person). But cf. In re Rhodes, 44 Ch.D. 94 (Ch. App.) (1890) (holding services to insane
person intended as a gift).
42. See, e.g., Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871) (owner of drifting boat unknown); Berry
v. Barbour, 279 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954) (beneficiary away in Europe).
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contracts to rescue frequently are enormous. When prohibitive transaction
costs block an express contract, a hypothetical contract does not necessa-
rily override individual preferences. A hypothetical contract may, on the
contrary, increase individuals' satisfaction by allowing them to make ex-
changes they would have made themselves but for high transaction costs.
B. Pareto-superiority
The essence of contract is agreement."' Contract derives its normative
force from the principle that it is fair to hold parties to their own bar-
gains."" Hence there can be no hypothetical contract without a proxy for
actual agreement. There must be a reason to conclude that the parties
would have agreed to the terms imposed by the court if transaction costs
had been lower.45
In general, a person would agree to a transaction that makes him better
off.46 For both parties to agree, both must be made better off.47 If both
parties are made better off, then the transaction is Pareto-superior by def-
inition.48  Hypothetical contracts, then, must be shown to be Pareto-
superior.49 This formulation of the hypothetical contract model gives con-
43. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1978) (contract is legal obligation resulting from parties' agreement).
Other authorities define contract in promissory terms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS
§ 1 (1981) ("A contract is a promise. . . for the breach of which the law gives a remedy. . . ."); 1
S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, at § 1. The difference is irrelevant here: If one promises to do some-
thing, one agrees to do it.
44. See C. FRIED, supra note 26, at 14-21.
45. There are two questions: 1) would the parties have agreed, if transaction costs had been
lower? and 2) does the fact that the parties would have agreed justify judicial imposition of the terms
to which they would have agreed? Pareto-superiority provides the basis for an affirmative answer to
the first question. This Note assumes without argument that the answer to the second question is
"yes." See infra note 59 (summarizing Dworkin's argument that "micro" hypothetical contracts have
at least "pale binding force").
46. This assumes individuals are maximizers of their own satisfactions. See infra note 64.
47. If the transaction leaves a party no better off but no worse off, the party is indifferent as to
whether the transaction takes place. The hypothetical contract theory, by adopting the Pareto crite-
rion, assumes that individuals would agree to transactions which left their overall position unchanged.
This is an arbitrary assumption, but the assumption that individuals would not agree to such transac-
tions is equally arbitrary.
48. See supra note 4 (defining Pareto-superiority). This is not to say that Pareto-superiority guar-
antees that each individual will benefit from every transaction. Any contract that has a non-negative
expected value at the moment it is hypothetically made satisfies the Pareto criterion. See Polinsky,
supra note 34, at 407-08. Relaxing the requirement of non-negative outcomes in favor of mere non-
negative expectations might seem to expand the hypothetical contract principle almost endlessly. The
scope of the hypothetical contract theory, however, is limited by individuals' different attitudes toward
risk. See infra note 77.
49. Economists generally agree that the requirement of Pareto-superiority is too strict to justify
many redistributions in practice. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 83-85
(1978) (Pareto superiority virtually useless). But see P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, 146-56 (enlarged ed. 1983) (possibility of determining revealed preferences if certain re-
strictive conditions are met).
The Pareto criterion is more powerful, however, in the context of hypothetical contracts. One set of
problems, involving third-party effects, can be virtually eliminated. Insofar as parties to an express
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tent to the abstract principle of unjust enrichment: An individual is un-
justly enriched if he receives a benefit that he would have been willing to
pay for, ex ante, absent transaction costs. The Pareto criterion provides an
evidentiary basis for the conclusion that the party would have been willing
to pay.
The Pareto criterion protects individuals from judicially-imposed con-
tracts they would be unlikely to make for themselves. Richard Posner's
competing theory of wealth maximization does not afford this protection.50
Posner rejects the relatively restrictive Pareto criterion: He would permit
any transaction that increases aggregate social wealth.5 1 Although wealth
maximization is a "potential Pareto criterion," in the sense that those who
gain from a wealth-maximizing transaction could fully compensate the
losers, Posner's criterion does not require compensation in fact.52 Hence
the wealth-maximization principle would permit judges to impose hypo-
thetical contracts even though some individuals would thereby be made
worse off. But individuals are unlikely to agree to being made worse off,
as some of Posner's critics have pointed out. 53 Although Posner dismisses
this criticism with the remark that "only a fanatic would insist that una-
agreement arc free to ignore externalities-and they generally are, unless the contract is found viola-
tive of public policy, see Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 19, 62 N.E. 763, 764
(1902) (public policy limitations on express contracts)-it is reasonable to ignore externalities in find-
ing hypothetical contracts.
50. Posner has argued that common law rules generally both do and should maximize aggregate
social wealth. Compare R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 6 (1981) (asserting that efficiency is an ade-
quate concept of justice) with Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 281, 287-91 (1979) (Posner's main concern positive, not normative).
51. R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 92-99. Posner recognizes that his wealth-maximization concept
is functionally equivalent to Kaldor-Hicks optimality. Id. at 91-92. A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks-
superior if one party gains more than the other loses. A distribution is Kaldor-Hicks optimal if no
Kaldor-Hicks-superior redistributions are possible. Critics have argued that Posner is wrong to iden-
tify wealth-maximization with Kaldor-Hicks optimality. See Hammond, The Economics of Justice
and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1982) (review-
ing R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)) (wealth maximization incorporates income
distribution by evaluating ability to pay). The differences are irrelevant to this discussion, since both
wealth-maximization and Kaldor-Hicks optimality aim at maximizing a social aggregate, without
regard to whether some individuals are made worse off.
52. See R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 91. This difference has led one commentator to conclude
that "[alctual markets embody respect for the individual and his choice, whereas [wealth-maximizing]
hypothetical markets entail the sacrifice of the interests of some individuals in the name of maximiza-
tion." Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. TOROTro L.J. 307, 322 (1980).
Posner's discussion of wealth maximization as a proxy for agreement is ambiguous. See R. POSNER,
supra note 34, at 88-115. He may believe that each individual benefits in the long run from consis-
tent application of the wealth-maximization principle. That is, Posner may believe that a single,
global, universal hypothetical contract to wealth-maximize in every situation is Pareto-superior to the
absence of such a contract. Posner does not offer any evidence to show that such a contract is Pareto-
superior, however. Alternatively, Posner may believe that wealth maximization is a sufficient condi-
tion for hypothetical consent.
53. See, e.g., Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 202 (1980) ("crazy" for
individuals to choose to maximize social wealth as surrogate for individual wealth); Kronman, supra
note 9, at 237 (1980) (Posner's examples have moral appeal only because they meet Pareto criterion).
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nimity be required," 4 dissent undermines any rule that draws its justifi-
catory force from agreement. "I would not have agreed," if true, is a fatal
response to a proposed hypothetical agreement, even if the failure to agree
is based on idiosyncratic or accidental characteristics of the individual.55
While many legal rules impose liability on individuals who would not
have agreed to be made liable, it is an abuse of language to call such
liability contractual.
C. When is the Contract Pareto-superior?
Posner's wealth-maximization criterion is unsatisfactory on another
level: Wealth is not the only possible goal. Individuals may prefer to trade
off wealth for some non-pecuniary good they value. In order to preserve
individual autonomy, the hypothetical contract theory must require clear
evidence that a court-imposed transaction makes the involuntary parties
subjectively better off, not merely that it increases their wealth.56 Some
critics of hypothetical contract theory argue that this is impossible because
human preferences are so diverse, arguing, for example, that individuals
care how their preferences are satisfied:57 They may prefer to benefit from
their own efforts rather than from the unsolicited efforts of others."8 The
hypothetical contract model must acknowledge these preferences, even if
they are idiosyncratic.59
54. R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 97.
55. See infra pp. 425-26 (discussing treatment of idiosyncratic preferences).
56. That is, the Pareto criterion must measure utility rather than wealth. Posner has canvassed
the difficulties raised by any attempt to measure utility. See R. PosNER, supra note 34, at 51-60.
57. See Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Pos-
ner's The Economics of Justice (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1117-31 (1982). Coleman
argues for a fuller specification of individual utility functions, including non-pecuniary sources of
satisfaction. Coleman apparently accepts the basic economic assumption that individuals are rational
maximizers of their satisfactions, see R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 1-2 (assumption is economist's
"basic analytical tool").
58. Coleman, supra note 57, at 1126-27.
59. One possible solution to the problem of human diversity is to deprive individuals of informa-
tion about their particular situations. Then only a single "representative" individual remains. If that
individual would agree, then all would agree. John Rawls calls this solution the "veil of ignorance."
J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). Rawls is the most recent contributor to a tradition
of political theory which attempts to justify the civil state on the basis of a hypothetical social contract.
See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (ed. J. Gough 1961) (Ist ed. London 1690); J.
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACr (L. Crocker ed. 1967) (1st ed. Paris 1762). See generally J.
GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (2d ed. 1957) (discussing the contractarian tradition). Hypothetical
contract in political theory usually is justified by pointing out that an express contract involving so
many parties is impossible.
Rawls' "veil of ignorance" solution is controversial even for a "macro" social contract, the choice of
basic principles of social justice. See R. NozIcK, supra note 9, at 198-213 (principle of fair resource
distribution is historical; any "patterned" distribution principle requires continuous government inter-
vention). The Rawlsian solution has virtually no appeal as a specification of conditions for "micro"
hypothetical contracts made against the background of an existing set of social arrangements. See R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 151-52 (1977) (analogy to poker game: player is not obli-
gated to throw in a winning hand when a card is discovered missing from the deck just because he
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Two factors, however, simplify the undertaking. One is that, despite
idiosyncracy, some human preferences are nearly unanimous.6" The sec-
ond is that individuals often reveal their preferences through actions.61 In
some situations, then, a court can conclude with great confidence that the
parties would have agreed to the terms it imposes.
The Pareto-superiority requirement incorporates a respect for prefer-
ences if they have been manifested. Although some subjective preferences
and values are not provable, even express contract doctrine rejects the
view that the parties are bound only if they subjectively intend to be
bound.62 To the extent that the hypothetical contract model permits mis-
takes about parties' subjective preferences, these mistakes are no more se-
rious than those permitted by the law of express contract.63
1. Hypothetical Contracts to Save Life
Individuals desire continued existence, not only as an end in itself, but
because a person is likely to be the most effective agent for carrying out
his own projects." Therefore individuals would rather pay for unsolicited
life rescues than die, both because they place a high value on their own
lives, and because death is the extreme reduction of individual autonomy.
Not all individuals desire to go on living at all times. The hypothetical
contract theory, through the Pareto-superiority requirement, respects a
preference for death over life if there is evidence for the existence of the
would have agreed to such a rule before play began). Since parties to an express contract do not
ignore information about their own preferences, parties to a hypothetical contract should not be de-
prived of that information.
This Note does not attempt to compare the "macro" hypothetical contracts of the political theorists
to the "micro" hypothetical contracts considered here. Dworkin argues that hypothetical contract has
no "pale binding force" in the social contract situation, but may be important in "micro" situations if
there is reason to believe the party's "will was inclined toward the decision at the time and in the
circumstances that the decision was taken." Id. at 152.
60. For example, the preference to go on living seems to be nearly unanimous.
61. See P. SAMUEI.SON, supra note 49, at 146-56 (revealed preference theory).
62. Express contract doctrine relies on objective behavior, rather than the subjective meeting of the
parties' minds. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 201 F. 664 (2d
Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). Similarly, hypothetical contracts should be imposed when objec-
tive evidence indicates that the parties would have agreed. Individuals typically reveal their preference
to go on living or increase their stock of wealth through their behavior considered as a whole. Cf P.
SAMUELSON, supra note 49, at 146-56 (revealed preference theory).
63. Even though express contract may be viewed as the paradigm of an autonomous transaction,
the need to interpret express contracts will inevitably lead to some departures from the subjective
intentions of the parties. Cf Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("A word...
is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which it is used."). An express contract might, however, provide some addi-
tional objective evidence of the parties' preferences.
64. The proposition assumes that individuals have goals. Arguably, having a goal implies having a
desire to pursue those means likely to achieve it. This assumption, that individuals are "minimally
rational," is crucial to Rawls' theory of justice. See J. RAWLS, supra note 59, at 142-50; see also K.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 19-21 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing this paradigm of
rationality); A. SFN, supra note 4, at 16-20 (same).
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preference.0 5 Similarly, other people may prefer to live but place a very
low value on their lives. Again, there is likely to be some objective evi-
dence of the lower bound of that subjective value.6
2. Hypothetical Contracts to Save Property
Restitution for saving money or other highly liquid67 property satisfies
the Pareto criterion in all circumstances. Most individuals would pay a
small amount of money in order to preserve a larger amount of money.
Those who would not may simply refuse to accept the cash; they are then
no worse off than if no one had attempted to confer a benefit on them. 68
Acceptance of the benefit demonstrates that the Pareto criterion has been
subjectively met. If, on the other hand, the beneficiary cannot costlessly
refuse the benefit, because it is not easily severable from his other assets,
then the Pareto criterion would not necessarily be met and the hypotheti-
cal contract theory would deny recovery.6 9
3. Altruism and Risk Preference
Altruistic individuals-those who are willing to confer benefits without
compensation 70-pose an additional problem for hypothetical contract the-
ory. Beneficiaries naturally would prefer a free benefit to one they are
obligated to pay for. 1 Even altruists are likely to claim compensation if
they are entitled to it." Since there is usually no way to tell, either ex post
or ex ante, whether the plaintiff is an altruist,7 1 the Pareto criterion for-
65. See infra notes 102-03 (discussing common law treatment of idiosyncratic preferences).
66. Such objective evidence may include a life insurance policy or expenditures for food or medical
care.
67. An asset is more liquid if it has more of the characteristics of cash. See P. SAMUELSON,
EcoNoMicS 328-31 (11th ed. 1980) (discussing liquidity preference schedule).
68. Such contracts can actually be viewed as express contracts. The performing party makes a
"reverse unilateral offer" by conferring the benefit. The beneficiary's acceptance or rejection of the
benefit constitutes an express acceptance or rejection of the offer. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 3, § 2-14, at 54-55 (defining reverse unilateral contracts). Except for unsolicited merchan-
dise delivered by mail, see 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1982), silence generally constitutes acceptance in the law
of contracts if the goods are returnable. See 1 A. CoRBIN, supra note 1, § 75, at 316; 1 S. WILLISTON,
supra note 3, § 91D, at 332.
69. The defendant might find it costly to pay an immediate cash judgment because he is short of
cash. The defendant might be worse off even in the long-run if it is very costly for him to borrow
money, or if he has other very attractive uses for his money.
70. Altruism is discussed in Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 93-100.
71. Even if beneficiaries preferred to pay for the benefit, they could make the payment volunta-
rily. They would then enjoy the additional benefit of being regarded as generous.
72. Most altruists are "imperfect" altruists. That is, they would prefer an extra dollar in their
own bank account to an extra dollar in the beneficiary's bank account. While the rescuer could decline
to claim compensation, and thereby benefit by being regarded as an altruist, claiming restitution is not
inconsistent with willingness to perform an altruistic rescue. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at
93-95.
73. Ex ante, the question is likely to be open, since the rescuer has not yet made a decision. Ex
post, the rescuer has an incentive to testify that he intended to charge in order to recover.
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bids imposing a hypothetical contract if the beneficiary might have decided
not to purchase the benefit in hopes of getting it for nothing. 4 The possi-
bility of altruism, therefore, obstructs most hypothetical contracts. In fact,
the problem of altruism explains the common law's refusal to award resti-
tution to those who did not intend to charge for their services.7 5
The possibility of altruism does not, however, bar hypothetical contracts
to save lives. This is easily shown by examining the possibility of altruistic
life rescue from the standpoint of the beneficiary at the time the hazard
arises. If transaction costs were zero, the beneficiary would decide
whether to pay for a life rescue based on his assessment of the probability
that the potential rescuer is an altruist. The beneficiary would be extraor-
dinarily unlikely to reject the contract, though, because he would be high-
ly uncertain about the actual probability that the other party is an altru-
ist. This would increase his incentive to pay to ensure a rescue. Moreover,
the benefit of life rescue is so large in relation to the probable cost that the
possibility of altruism would probably have only a marginal effect on the
rescuee's risk-benefit calculation. 6
The conclusion does not change when risk preference is taken into ac-
count.7 7 Risk avoiders would be particularly inclined to purchase rescue
services. Risk lovers might prefer to chance not being rescued by an altru-
ist at no cost. Given the huge disparity between cost and benefit, and the
beneficiary's level of uncertainty, however, the possibility that one would
be so risk-loving as to refuse to pay is extremely remote. Once again, an
individual with such idiosyncratic preferences will undoubtedly have pro-
vided evidence of them in the past.
III. THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACT THEORY AND THE COMMON
LAW OF RESTITUTION FOR UNSOLICITED BENEFITS
Judges and scholars have rejected hypothetical contract as a supplement
to the unjust enrichment principle.78 But since the unsolicited benefit cases
74. The contract would be Pareto-superior if:
B - C > p(B),
where B is the value of the benefit, C is the cost of paying for benefit, and p is the probability that the
rescuer is an altruist.
75. See infra p. 429.
76. Social psychologists have suggested that altruistic behavior is often unlikely even in easy res-
cue situations. See B. LATANP & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER (1970).
77. Some individuals are risk-averse. They prefer less uncertainty to more, other things being
equal. Other individuals are risk-lovers. Individuals may behave like risk-lovers for psychological rea-
sons. See G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDErTS 55-58 (1970) (individuals may lack information,
be unable to conceive of themselves suffering an injury, or favor short-term over long-term utility).
Since the hypothetical contract is not made until a hazardous situation has actually arisen, the theory
does not paternalistically override these psychological biases. For a general discussion of uncertainty,
see P. LAYARD & A. WALTERS, MICROECONoMIc THEORY 351-90 (1978).
78. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTrrrION, supra note 1, § 1 comment a (unjust en-
The Yale Law Journal
are largely consonant with the model of hypothetical contract,79 judges
appear to be influenced by contractual principles in spite of what they
say. The hypothetical contract approach explains many of the unsolicited
benefit cases."0 Moreover, the hypothetical contract theory clarifies the
analysis of all the unsolicited benefit cases by making explicit the contrac-
tual principles which have been tacitly applied under the rubric of "unjust
enrichment."
The hypothetical contract theory explains the common law rules gov-
erning recovery for unsolicited benefits. The common law denies restitu-
tion if the plaintiff was an "officious intermeddler,"81 intended to confer
the benefit gratuitously, 2 or conferred an unmeasurable benefit.8 3 The
first limitation is equivalent to a requirement of prohibitive transaction
costs. The second and third limitations embody the Pareto-superiority
condition. The amount of recovery allowed is also consistent with hypo-
thetical contract theory.
A. Officiousness
Legal hostility toward "officiousness" incorporates the high transaction
costs condition.8" Courts use the vague term "officious" to bar recovery if
the plaintiff could have negotiated with the defendant before conferring
the benefit. For example, a worker who performs repairs on a house with-
out a contract is barred, as an officious intermeddler, from recovering his
costs, even if he increases the value of the house.8 5 But a court may permit
recovery if repairs are necessary to prevent a loss, and if the owner cannot
be contacted. 8
richment priciple is independent of both contract and tort principles); supra note 3 (restitution not
based on intentions, actual or hypothetical, of parties).
79. See infra pp. 428-433.
80. Some cases further a policy, also largely unarticulated, of encouraging inexpensive private
discharge of public duties. Providing necessities to children and burying the dead, for example, further
such a policy. See supra notes 12-13.
81. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTON, supra note 1, § 2 comment a ("Officiousness means
interference in the affairs of others not justified by the circumstances under which the interference
takes place."); Hope, supra note 12, at 25-27.
82. See RESTATEMENT OF RESIsTiON, supra note 1, § 116; Wade, supra note 1, at 1190-94.
83. Wide, supra note 1, at 1186-90.
84. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 89-90.
85. See Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448 (1874); RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrtuTiON, supra note 1, §
112 illus. 3.
86. See Berry v. Barbour, 279 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954) (fire burned holes in roof of warehouse
while owner in Europe). In Berry, however, the plaintiffs were already under contract to repair the
warehouse, so the court was able to find the emergency repairs within the "implied" scope of the
agency. Id. at 337-38.
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B. Intent to Charge
The common law allows recovery for an unsolicited benefit only if the
rescuer intended to charge.8 7 This requirement partially incorporates the
Pareto condition, by denying recovery to altruists.88 The common law rule
would dispose of the problem of altruism, except that it may be impossible
to determine whether individuals truly intended to assist gratuitously.89
The Restatement establishes a set of presumptions to deal with this prob-
lem in emergency situations: Professionals are presumed to intend to
charge; non-professionals are presumed not to intend to charge.9" These
presumptions are consistent with hypothetical contract theory. Profession-
als, by definition, perform services for profit. Since professionalism is a
good but imperfect proxy for hon-altruism," a set of rebuttable presump-
tions is consistent with the hypothetical contract theory.9"
C. Measurable Benefit
The common law denies recovery for an unsolicited benefit unless the
benefit is measurable in dollars.98 This rule, along with the requirement
of an intention to charge, satisfies the Pareto condition.9 If the benefit is
87. See Ryan v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70, 150 A.2d 906 (1959) (accepting defense that plaintiff
intended payment of bills as a gift); RESTATEMENT OF RESTrUTION, supra note 1, §§ 116(a),
117(d).
88. See supra pp. 426-27 (discussion of altruism).
89. See supra note 73.
90. See RESTATEMENT OF REnTTTON, supra note 1, § 114 comment c.
91. Some professionals, such as professional salvors at sea, almost never rescue gratuitously. In
fact, the legal entitlement to compensation calls forth resources devoted to professional maritime sal-
vage. Cf. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK supra note 22, § 8-4, at 541-46 (professional salvors allowed to
recover without regard to their intent to charge). Other professionals, such as physicians, derive most
of their income from express contracts, and so might undertake some gratuitous rescues without
greatly reducing their income. The widespread enactment of so-called "Good Samaritan statutes,"
which immunize physicians, and sometimes others, from negligence in providing emergency medical
assistance, suggests that many physicians are not altruistic enough to rescue if they might be sued for
malpractice. See Note, Good Sanaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLuM. L. REV.
1301, 1302 (1964).
92. Presumptions are a classic legal response to uncertainty. See MCCORMICK, MCCoRMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 343 (3d ed. 1984). Some cases and commentators suggest that the presumption that non-
professionals do not intend to charge should be irrebuttable. See Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns.
28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822); Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567, 13 P. 442 (1887); F. WOODWARD, THE LAW
OF QuAsI CONTRACTS 314 (1913). Hypothetical contract theory suggests this rule is too strict. Plain-
tiffs should be allowed to carry the burden, if they can, of showing they would not have rescued
absent a right to recover. Cf R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW OF REsTITUTION 271 (2d ed. 1978)
(burden of showing gratuitous intent should be defendant's).
93. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, 103-04. Physicians' services are a clear example. See, e.g.,
Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); In re Crisan Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 107
N.W.2d 907 (1961).
94. Plaintiffs are also barred from recovering if the benefit was incidental to a project plaintiff
would have undertaken anyway. See Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 80 Me. 500, 15 A. 65 (1888) (plaintiff
cannot recover for unavoidably draining defendant's quarry while draining his own quarry); RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTON, supra note 1, § 106. This rule is also consistent with the Pareto
criterion, since the plaintiff will provide the benefit whether or not he is entitled to compensation.
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measurable, the court can determine that the benefits of the transaction
exceed the costs.
If there is a market price for the benefit conferred, it is not difficult to
show that the Pareto condition is met. The owner presumably valued the
property at least as highly as the market does; otherwise, he would have
been better off selling the property for its market price.9" The court can
be confident, therefore, that the owner will not be required to pay more
for the rescue than he would have agreed to pay ex ante.96
Even though the benefit is clearly worth more than the cost of the judg-
ment, the Pareto condition may not be satisfied if the benefit is conferred
in a highly illiquid form,97 since the beneficiary must pay a judgment in
cash.98 Judges have recognized this problem in the context of improve-
ments to land, and have fashioned ingenious remedies to handle it.99
Courts generally decline to award restitution for nonmarketable bene-
fits.' 00 This is also consistent with hypothetical contract theory. If there is
no market for the benefit, courts may overestimate the beneficiary's sub-
jective evaluation of the benefit, thus imposing a contract to which he
would not have agreed ex ante.
If the plaintiff has saved the defendant's life, however, restitution satis-
fies the Pareto condition, even though the benefit is not marketable.1 '
Courts have been faced with a few problem cases involving atypical pref-
erences. A person attempting suicide is expressly revealing a preference
for death.'0 2 For him, presumably, continued existence has a negative
value. Unless the individual later regrets the decision, and is grateful for
being saved, hypothetical contract theory would deny recovery. Moreover,
some individuals would prefer death to certain types of medical treatment
95. It is possible that the owner valued the property less than the market, but did not sell because
of high transaction costs. In that case, however, he is free to refuse the property.
96. For a discussion of how much the beneficiary will be made to pay, see infra pp. 431-32.
97. The best example is an improvement to land. See, e.g., Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578,
232 N.W. 200 (1930); Sykes v. Sykes, 262 Ala. 277, 78 So. 2d 273 (1954). See supra p. 426 (discus-
sion of liquidity of benefit).
98. Even so, the beneficiary may be able to borrow against the benefit conferred in order to pay a
judgment. But see supra note 69 (cost of borrowing may exceed value of benefit).
99. In Union Hall Ass'n v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 (1873), defendant was given the option of
paying a cash judgment or conveying the improved property in return for its unimproved value in
cash. In Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1956), the defendant was ordered to exchange the
improved lot for an unimproved lot.
100. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note 1, § 1 comment b (person normally must
pay only for pecuniary advantage).
101. See supra pp. 425-26.
102. See Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904) (physician-patient rela-
tionship established even though decedent, who had taken rat poison, cursed at physician and ordered
him out of the room); Matheson v. Smiley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. Ct. App.) (surgeon recovers
even though patient's wound was self-inflicted). But see Soldiers Memorial Hospital v. Sanford,
[1934] 2 D.L.R. 334 (N.S.S.C.) (recovery denied where plaintiff arrested and taken to hospital
against his will).
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for religious reasons.1 03 Again, hypothetical contract theory would not al-
low recovery in these cases. The inconsistent results of the few reported
cases suggest that these situations push the hypothetical contract idea to its
limits. 04
D. Amount of the Award
Judges have limited recoveries for unsolicited benefits to the cost of the
goods or services provided, or to the value of the benefit conferred, which-
ever is less.105 This rule is also consistent with hypothetical contract the-
ory. In general, a Pareto-superior contract is possible if the benefits of
performance to the promisee exceed the costs of performance to the prom-
isor. Absent an established market price for the performance, the parties
might agree on any price less than the benefit to the promisee but greater
than the cost to the promisor.106 All such prices are Pareto superior, and
so fulfill the requirements of hypothetical contract. A price closer to the
promisor's cost of performance, however, gives the promisee more of the
surplus from the transaction. This result is preferable because the contract
is hypothetical on one side only. The rescuer conferred a benefit voluntar-
ily. Since she was free not to confer the benefit, she is not justified in
103. Courts have considered whether Jehovah's Witnesses may refuse blood transfusions in life-
threatening situations for religious reasons. Conpare In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965) (state-appointed conservator may not compel transfusion that will probably save
life of adult without minor children if she has steadfastly refused transfusion for religious reasons with
knowledge that death may result from her refusal) and In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 913, 390
N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (refusal of competent, non-pregnant adult without minor children
must be upheld, even though transfusion may be necessary to save her life) with In re President of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering emergency blood transfusion to
save life of Jehovah's Witness with minor child, in spite of her religious objections), cert. denied sub
non. Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964) and Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (authorizing blood transfusion for
non-consenting pregnant Jehovah's Witness), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); see also J. GOLD-
STEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 95-96 (1979) (discuss-
ing unreported decision requiring treatment for newborn, but permitting mother to choose death for
herself).
At least one court has held that where a legally incompetent patient's life is not threatened by her
religious objections to medical procedures, the court must determine what choice the individual would
make if she were competent. See In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).
104. Individual decisions to commit suicide or refuse medical treatment are difficult because there
is no consensus that a decision to die may be rational. Cf. A. CAMUS, THE M'TH OF SISYPHUs 55
(1955) (suicide not justified even if life has no meaning).
105. See Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 156-57, 203 P.2d 387, 392 (1949); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTrrUTION, supra note 1, §§ 42(1), 53(2)(a) (recovery for mistaken improvements to land limited
to increase in value, not cost, if latter is greater); 2 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITrTioN §10.9, at 453
(1978).
106. Economic analysis of rescue cases has been largely concerned with determining the efficient
(i.e., wealth-maximizing) level of compensation. Diamond & Mirrlees conclude that giving the total
benefit to the rescuer or to the rescuee results in inefficient incentives to avoid losses or to rescue,
respectively. Diamond & Mirrlees, On the Assignment of Liability: The Uniform Case, 6 BE.LL J.
ECON. 487, 512 (1975). Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 93, argue that judges should award the
market price of the rescue, or an approximation of that amount.
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complaining about the size of the recovery. It is still possible, however,
that the court will overestimate the subjective value of the benefit to the
defendant.10 7  Choosing the minimum recovery to which the plaintiff
would have consented minimizes the number of mistakes that can result
from such overestimations, thereby maximizing protection of autonomy.
If there is a market for the rescue services, the market price determines
the amount of the recovery. 0 ' This is easy to determine, although courts
have disagreed over the rescuer's right to price discriminate or to charge
fees higher than the local average."' Where there is no market for the
rescue services, the court must arrive at a reasonable award on equitable
principles.11 Since this is costly and imprecise, devices such as statutory
awards of a percentage of the value of the salved property are useful. 1 '
E. The Failure of Alternative Theories
Hypothetical contract theory offers a better explanation of the common
law of recovery for unsolicited benefits than Posner's wealth-maximization
approach. Wealth maximization is an inadequate explanation because the
common law denies recovery in many situations in which intervention
would create an enormous increase in social wealth. 2 The explanatory
power of the hypothetical contract model thus casts doubt on Posner's
general thesis that the common law promotes economic efficiency. 1
The hypothetical contract theory is also superior to Richard Epstein's
107. The beneficiary may value the benefit more than the amount of the judgment, but less than
the sum of the judgment and his litigation costs. Since litigation costs are real costs to the defendant,
they should be counted. The plaintiff might be required to pay all costs of litigation, but this would
give the beneficiary no incentive to control costs. A better rule is that the plaintiff recovers nothing if
the benefit is less than the sum of the cost of the judgment and litigation costs; otherwise, plaintiff
recovers and each side pays its own litigation costs.
108. This is the case, for example, when physicians treat unconscious patients. See Cotnam v.
Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907).
109. Compare id. at 607-08, 104 S.W. at 166-67 (physician may not price discriminate) with
Matheson v. Smiley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. Ct App.) (price discrimination allowed).
110. The general principles are similar to those used to determine salvage awards in admiralty.
See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869) (factors include: labor expended by salvors;
promptness, skill and energy; value of property employed by salvors, and danger to which such prop-
erty was exposed; risk incurred by salvors; value of property saved; degree of danger from which
property was rescued). The allocatively efficient solution is to pay the rescuer her reservation
price-that is, just enough to induce her to carry out the rescue.
111. See, e.g., CAUF. AGRIC. CODE § 17095 (West 1968) (estrays); Wade, supra note 1, at 1213
n.162 (collecting statutes).
112. Easy life rescue is the most dramatic case. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-91 (1973) (Learned Hand Test would require easy life rescue, since benefit
far exceeds cost). The Landes & Posner paper, see supra note 1, which attempts to reconcile the
common law rules with the wealth-maximization principle, is unpersuasive. See 2 G. PALMER, supra
note 105, § 10.3 (Supp. 1982). Landes and Posner themselves concede that they fall to show conclu-
sively that the common law rules are consistent with efficiency. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at
126.
113. See supra note 50.
Hypothetical Contract
tort analysis of the unsolicited benefit cases."1 Epstein rejects the imposi-
tion of tort liability for failure to provide unsolicited benefits, 1 5 but agrees
that the recipients of those benefits should have to pay for them. 1 Ep-
stein claims that the primary advantage of his theory of strict liability in
tort is its protection of autonomy. 17 Yet, in order to explain the cases
which permit restitution for unsolicited benefits, Epstein introduces ad hoc
efficiency considerations that undercut autonomy values.11 Thus, Ep-
stein's approach not only is complicated and ad hoc, but it also explicitly
trades off autonomy for efficiency. Epstein's approach has been severely
criticized on this ground,"19 and Epstein himself is "uneasy" with the
results.120
114. Epstein's theory, which imposes tort liability only if the defendant caused the harm in one of
four ways, is presented in a series of articles. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 112;
Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974);
Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975).
115. Epstein has argued that a duty to rescue is inconsistent with autonomy values, and cannot be
kept from turning into a general duty of beneficence. Epstein, supra note 112, at 189-204.
Many commentators have gone beyond a restitution regime and argued for a duty to rescue, at least
when life is at stake and can be saved at no risk and very little cost to the rescuer. See Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908); see also Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE
L.J. 247, 287-92 (1980) (duty to rescue consistent with Kantian moral philosophy). Such duties are
imposed in some civil law countries, see Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 631, 635-41 (1952) (discussing duty to rescue in Soviet Union and France), and in
Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973), and Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05
(West Supp. 1984).
Rescue duties have seldom been based on hypothetical contract. A recent comment, however, does
attempt to base "easy"-that is, riskless and essentially costless-life rescue on a hypothetical con-
tract. See Comment, Beiyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification
of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252, 278 (1983) (Duty to rescue "would be
unanimously endorsed by autonomous individuals who structure their social interactions according to
general principles.") (italics omitted). This effort, while it suggests the possible range of the hypotheti-
cal contract theory, is unconvincing. First, easy rescue is a trivial case. Even low rescue costs create
the likelihood that some individuals would not find it worthwhile to enter into a general contract to
make easy rescues. Moreover, a duty to rescue deprives rescuers of the utility they might derive from
being thought of as altruists. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 93-94.
116. See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
477, 490-93 (1979).
117. Epstein, supra note 112, at 203-04.
118. Epstein, supra note 116, at 490.
119. Posner has criticized this position as internally inconsistent, because Epstein is willing to
accept compensation for rescuers, and compensation is also a "forced" transaction. Posner, Epstein's
Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 460-65 (1979); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 218-20 (1973).
120. Epstein has said that he accepts compensation "uneasily," because his concern for autonomy
is constrained by efficiency considerations, and because compensation is an administratively cheaper
regime than duty to rescue, and a lesser restriction on autonomy. See Epstein, supra note 116, at
490-93. In fact, a compensation regime may be more expensive to administer than is a duty-to-rescue
regime. Under a compensation regime, each rescue will result in a costly proceeding. Under a duty-to-
rescue regime, many individuals would simply rescue and go about their business, at no administrative
cost. The causation questions under the two regimes are essentially similar. In the compensation cases,
the rescuer would have to show that, but for her intervention, the loss would have occurred; in the
duty to rescue cases, one who declined to rescue would have to show that the loss would have occurred
in spite of her intervention.
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CONCLUSION
The theory of hypothetical contract is a logical extension of the law of
contract. Hypothetical contract theory explains the common law of restitu-
tion for unsolicited benefits better than do competing analyses. In addition
to its positive explanatory power, the theory affords greater protection for
individual autonomy than do alternative theories of liability.
Critics may object that the theory of hypothetical contract blurs the dis-
tinction between liability based on express agreement and liability im-
posed on other grounds.1"1 Hypothetical contract, one might object, is a
long and dangerous step toward the re-absorption of contract law into a
general law of obligation, the law of "contorts." 1"2 These objections are
not well founded. The theory of hypothetical contract presented here is
strictly limited by the requirements of prohibitive transaction costs and
Pareto superiority. Moreover, the theory explicitly distinguishes cases de-
cided by extending contractual principles from cases decided on non-
contractual principles. Such a clear distinction should retard, not acceler-
ate, the conflation of contract and tort.
-Robert A. Long, Jr.
121. Libertarians, who believe that government is never justified in compelling a redistribution of
wealth, might be inclined to take this view. See F. HAYEic, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 93-102
(1960); R. NozicK, supra note 9, at 149-53, 167-74.
122. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF ColTAcT 90 (1974); P. ATrYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 717-79 (1979) (move away from executory model of exchange). Posner
also argues for breaking down the walls of the doctrinal compartments. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory,
supra note 119, at 464 (Tort, contract, and restitution "reflect a common concern with facilitating the
operation of free markets given positive transaction costs.").
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